

# Truth Chapter 4: Methodology and Scientific Realism

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- Realism vs. Anti-Realism
- Horwich's characterization
- Verificationism
- Scientific justification
- Other issues

# Realism vs. Anti-Realism

Is truth independent from our theorizing?

For instance in mathematics: Platonism vs. Intuitionism

Note the use of “Truth”

Therefore, doesn't minimalism have implications for the debate?  
If not, *shouldn't* it have?

Central problem: autonomy of the world *and* epistemological access?

Realists: not a problem after all

Anti-realists: solve it by either

- (i) Denying autonomous facts (formalism, relativism)
- (ii) Denying epistemological access (scepticism)
- (iii) Reducing problematic to non-problematic facts (behaviourism, logicism)

This problem is independent of any theory of truth

Suppose truth is identified with ideal verifiability

Such verificationism apparently rules out scepticism

Horwich: No, sceptics can deny that any  $p$  is verifiable

Even if they accepted  $p$  is verifiable, this commits them to ' $p$ ' is true', not to  $p$

Verificationism apparently rules out realism

Horwich: No, it gives us (10) but not (11):

(10) ' $p$ ' is true' means ' $p$ ' is verifiable'

(11) ' $p$ ' means ' $p$ ' is verifiable'

Suppose we explain why  $M$  is reliable, but partially do so using  $M$   
Does this justify  $M$ ?

Friedman: A little,  $M$  also could've shown its own *unreliability*

However, given minimalism, this “justification” would be trivial via the T-schema

Horwich: T-schema is true anyway, plus the justification was useless already

If truth is not defined as ideal verifiability, why would an ideal theory be true?

Horwich: If an ideal theory says  $p$ , then  $p$ , and then by T-schema " $p$ " is true

Given minimalism, how can we explain truth being intrinsically valuable?

Horwich: We can't, but that's because we don't understand intrinsic value

- Horwich's description of Realism vs. Anti-Realism
- Status of T-schema in rival truth theories